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New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira: Putting the Wheels Back on the
FAA’s Section 1 Exemption for Transportation Workers
I. Introduction
Arbitration is ubiquitous in modern-day America.1 Since the early
twentieth century, there has been a burgeoning trend of consumer contracts
and employment agreements containing provisions that require disputes
arising under the agreement to be resolved in an arbitral forum. 2 Today,
millions of American consumers3 and approximately a quarter of American
nonunion employees 4 are subject to mandatory arbitration agreements.
However, the wide use—and, often, blind acceptance—of arbitration
agreements is not without controversy. According to its largely corporate
proponents, arbitration is viewed as a means to wholly control adjudication
of disputes arising out of contract.5 Antagonists, however, maintain that the
often one-sided mandatory arbitration agreements deny customers and
employees the unique advantages that a judicial proceeding affords. 6
1. See Knepp v. Credit Acceptance Corp. (In re Knepp), 229 B.R. 821, 828 (Bankr.
N.D. Ala. 1999) (“Arbitration was innocuous when limited to negotiated commercial
contracts, but it developed sinister characteristics when it became ubiquitous.”).
2. See KATHERINE V.W. STONE & ALEXANDER J.S. COLVIN, ECON. POLICY INST., THE
ARBITRATION EPIDEMIC: MANDATORY ARBITRATION DEPRIVES WORKERS AND CONSUMERS OF
THEIR RIGHTS 3–4 (2015), http://www.epi.org/files/2015/arbitration-epidemic.pdf.
3. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY: REPORT TO CONGRESS,
PURSUANT TO DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT §
1028(A) 9 (2015), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_arbitration-study-reportto-congress-2015.pdf.
4. STONE & COLVIN, supra note 2, at 15.
5. Corporate drafters can structure arbitration agreements to achieve a litany of goals
such as: confidentiality, avoiding adherence to the Federal Rules of Evidence and Civil
Procedure, immunity from class action, avoidance of jury trial, avoidance of appeal, etc. See,
e.g., Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 569 U.S. 564, 565 (2013) (“Class arbitration is a
matter of consent: An arbitrator may employ class procedures only if the parties have
authorized them.”); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 345 (2011) (“[T]he
informality of arbitral proceedings is itself desirable, reducing the cost and increasing the
speed of dispute resolution.”) (citing 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 269 (2009);
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)); First
Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995) (noting that under the Federal
Arbitration Act, courts may vacate an arbitrator’s decision “only in very unusual
circumstances”); Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 628 (“By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory
claim, a party . . . trades the procedures and opportunity for review of the courtroom for the
simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration.”).
6. See STONE & COLVIN, supra note 2, at 26; see also Taylor J. Freeman Peshehonoff,
Title VII’s Deficiencies Affect #MeToo: A Look at Three Ways Title VII Continues to Fail
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This Note will analyze New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, in which the Supreme
Court examined the scope of the Federal Arbitration Act’s (“FAA” or
“Act”) section 1 exemption and, for the first time in modern arbitration
jurisprudence, seized back some of the power that it had historically
relinquished in light of a supposed federal policy in favor of arbitration. 7
Part II provides a background of the Act, the Court’s historical treatment of
cases in which questions of arbitrability arise, and the circuit split that gave
rise to the Court’s review of the section 1 exemption. Part III describes the
facts surrounding New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira and analyzes the Court’s
reasoning. Part IV argues that courts have historically misapplied
Congress’s intent behind enacting the FAA and gone too far in allowing
arbitrators the authority to decide the limits of their own jurisdiction but
have now appropriately seized the opportunity to set forth a clear and
correct interpretation of the Act. Finally, Part V briefly concludes by setting
forth a few key questions that can only be answered through time and
further judicial interpretation.
II. Law Before New Prime
A. The Federal Arbitration Act
Before 1925, both state and federal courts showed great hostility towards
the enforcement of arbitration agreements. 8 Evidencing this trend, the

America’s Workforce, 72 OKLA. L. REV. 479, 515–16 (2020) (arguing that the often secretive
nature of arbitration eliminates many of the protections employment statutes, such as Title
VII, sought to create).
7. Compare Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24–25
(1983) (noting “a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration” and establishing the principle
that “any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of
arbitration”) (emphasis added), with H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1 (1924) (noting that the
purpose of enacting the FAA was to place agreements to arbitrate disputes “upon the same
footing as other contracts, where it belongs”) (emphasis added).
8. The House Report, generated as part of Congress’s enactment of the Federal
Arbitration Act, summarizes the history of judicial hostility as:
Some centuries ago, because of the jealousy of the English courts for their own
jurisdiction, they refused to enforce specific agreements to arbitrate upon the
ground that the courts were thereby ousted from their jurisdiction. This jealousy
survived for so long a period that the principle became firmly embedded in the
English common law and was adopted with it by the American courts. The
courts have felt that the precedent was too strongly fixed to be overturned
without legislative enactment, although they have frequently criticized the rule
and recognized its illogical nature and the injustice which results from it. The
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Supreme Court affirmed in Insurance Co. v. Morse that “[e]very citizen is
entitled to resort to all the courts of the country, and to invoke the
protection which all the laws or all those courts may afford him.”9 Further,
while a citizen is free to bind himself to arbitration, “[h]e cannot . . . bind
himself in advance by an agreement, which may be specifically enforced,
thus to forfeit his rights at all times and on all occasions, whenever the case
may be presented.”10 In response to this hostility, and with an express intent
to place arbitration agreements on the same footing as any other contract, 11
Congress promulgated the United States Arbitration Act, 12 which was
codified in 1947,13 and is known today as the Federal Arbitration Act. 14 The
FAA contains fifteen distinct sections with the most widely cited provisions
being sections 1, 2, 3, and 4.
While this Note will focus on the jurisdictional exemption contained
within section 1 of the Act, a cursory overview of each of the first four
sections is necessary to appreciate the judicial analysis required to resolve
disputes in which one party moves to compel arbitration.
Section 1 establishes the Act’s scope of application. 15 The FAA applies
to contracts that contain arbitration agreements in two areas of federal
jurisdiction: “[m]aritime transactions” and “commerce.” 16 The text of
section 1, however, expressly exempts “contracts of employment of
seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in
foreign or interstate commerce.”17
Section 2 of the FAA “is the primary substantive provision,” 18 and
substantively provides that “[a] written provision . . . to settle by arbitration
bill declares simply that such agreements for arbitration shall be enforced, and
provides a procedure in the Federal courts for their enforcement.
H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1–2.
9. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445, 451 (1874).
10. Id.
11. The House Report accompanying the FAA states plainly that “[a]rbitration
agreements are purely matters of contract,” and that the purpose of enacting the legislation
was to place agreements to arbitrate disputes “upon the same footing as other contracts,
where it belongs.” H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1.
12. United States Arbitration Act, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883, 886 (1925).
13. Federal Arbitration Act, ch. 392, 61 Stat. 669, 669 (1947).
14. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2018).
15. Id. § 1; see, e.g., Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52, 56–57 (2003); Circuit
City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 112 (2001); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v.
Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 274–76 (1995).
16. 9 U.S.C. § 1.
17. Id.
18. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2020

734

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:731

a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract . . . shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract.”19 Section 2 validates arbitration
agreements as contracts and expressly manifests Congress’s intent to ensure
that arbitration agreements would hold “the same footing as [all] other
contracts.”20
Sections 3 and 4 direct courts to stay the proceedings before them and
compel arbitration.21 Section 3 provides, in part, that “the court . . . upon
being satisfied that the issue involved . . . is referable to arbitration under
[the underlying contract], shall on application of one of the parties stay the
trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the
terms of the agreement.”22 Section 4 furnishes that “upon being satisfied
that the making of the agreement for arbitration . . . is not in issue, the court
shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in
accordance with the terms of the agreement.” 23 These sections specify the
action the court must take upon satisfaction that a controversy is, in fact,
arbitrable.
In short, section 1 sets forth the scope of the Act; section 2 validates
arbitration agreements as legally binding; and sections 3 and 4 direct courts
to abdicate their jurisdiction upon satisfaction that the underlying contract is
valid, and that the dispute falls within the range of issues contemplated by
the text of the agreement.
While the Act clearly and unambiguously delineates Congress’s intent to
place arbitration agreements on equal footing with all other contracts, it is
not without limits. The Act’s boundaries are primarily shown through two
distinct considerations. First, the FAA in itself does not create a basis for
federal jurisdiction. A federal court must find some independent basis of
jurisdiction before adjudicating a claim involving an arbitration dispute. 24
Second, the FAA is limited by section 1, which exempts from the FAA
19. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
20. H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1 (1924).
21. 9 U.S.C. §§ 3, 4.
22. Id. § 3.
23. Id. § 4.
24. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 15 n.9 (1984) (“While the Federal
Arbitration Act creates federal substantive law requiring the parties to honor arbitration
agreements, it does not create any independent federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 (1976) or otherwise.”) (citing Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr.
Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 n.32 (1983)); Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 25 n.32
(noting that the FAA requires “diversity of citizenship or some other independent basis for
federal jurisdiction”).
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“contracts of employment of transportation workers.”25 This Note focuses
on the latter.
B. The Court’s Treatment of Arbitrability Disputes
Following the enactment of the FAA, United States federal courts refined
their analysis and interpretation of disputes arising under contracts
containing an agreement to arbitrate. Slowly but surely, courts began to
uphold and enforce agreements to arbitrate. Over time, however, the
judiciary’s willingness to scrutinize arbitration agreements prior to
relinquishing jurisdiction to an arbitrator diminished to the point where
courts’ interpretation of the FAA appeared to place arbitration agreements
on a pedestal. 26
Two fundamental questions have arisen in modern arbitration
jurisprudence. The first asks whether the dispute is “arbitrable.” This
question turns on “whether the parties have agreed to submit a particular
grievance to arbitration.”27 Should the adjudicator determine that the parties
agreed to arbitrate a given dispute within the language of the contract, it is
referred to an arbitral forum. If they did not, the dispute is decided in a
court of law.
The second question considers the procedure for determining the first by
asking whether a court or an arbitrator should make the “merits”
determination. While the outcome should conceivably be the same
regardless of who makes the arbitrability determination, the procedural
question of who decides may, in fact, be dispositive of the merits
dispute28—most simply because arbitrators possess a perverse incentive to
determine a dispute’s arbitrability in a manner that allows them to retain
jurisdiction.29 As such, the procedural question has been hotly disputed and

25. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119 (2001).
26. See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24–25 (noting the “liberal federal
policy favoring arbitration” and establishing the principle that “any doubts concerning the
scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration”).
27. AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986).
28. See First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995) (“Hence, who—
court or arbitrator—has the primary authority to decide whether a party has agreed to
arbitrate can make a critical difference to a party resisting arbitration.”).
29. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 416 (1967)
(Black, J., dissenting) (“The only advantage of submitting the issue . . . to arbitration is for
the arbitrators. Their compensation corresponds to the volume of arbitration they perform.”).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2020

736

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:731

heavily litigated throughout the life of the Act, 30 and a brief discussion of
its historical treatment is warranted.
From the enactment of the FAA until the late 2000s, the established
principle regarding questions of arbitrability was that they were “an issue
for judicial determination . . . . Unless the parties clearly and unmistakably
provide otherwise.”31 The premise during this period was to give effect to
the parties’ intent by first answering the question of “who has the primary
power to decide arbitrability” by determining “what the parties agreed
about that matter.”32 Nonetheless, Congress originally reserved two issues
for the judiciary’s exclusive determination: (1) whether a given arbitration
clause bound the parties to a dispute and (2) whether a binding arbitration
clause applied to a particular type of controversy. 33 In 2010, however, the
Supreme Court announced that parties had the right to have arbitrators
determine all questions of arbitrability should they so choose, by declaring
that “parties can agree to arbitrate ‘gateway’ questions of ‘arbitrability,’
such as whether the parties have agreed to arbitrate or whether their
agreement covers a particular controversy.” 34
Today, because the Court broadly granted authority to arbitrators, cases
based on a contract containing an agreement to arbitrate are routinely
stayed and arbitration is compelled pending the arbitrator’s decision of its
own jurisdiction to decide the matter. Therein lies the fundamental issue
that has given rise to copious litigation in the twenty-first century: whether
an arbitrator should have the authority to determine its own—and, in turn,
the courts’—jurisdiction under the FAA. 35 The Court’s decision to abdicate
responsibility for deciding its own jurisdiction has effectively extirpated the
right of those on the wrong end of a contract containing an arbitration
agreement to be heard by a court of law.

30. See, e.g., Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 67–70 (2010); Howsam v.
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 84 (2002); First Options, 514 U.S. at 943–44.
31. AT&T Techs., 475 U.S. at 649; see also First Options, 514 U.S. at 943 (“Just as the
arbitrability of the merits of a dispute depends on whether the parties agreed to arbitrate that
dispute, so the question ‘who has the primary power to decide arbitrability’ turns upon what
the parties agreed about that matter.”) (citations omitted).
32. First Options, 514 U.S. at 943.
33. See Howsam, 537 U.S. at 84.
34. Rent-A-Ctr., 561 U.S. at 68–69.
35. For where the arbitrator determines they properly have jurisdiction to resolve a
dispute, they necessarily subjugate the court’s jurisdiction over the same. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 3,
4.
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C. The Circuit Split—Who Should Determine the Question of Arbitrability
When determining issues of arbitrability, the United States Supreme
Court has routinely held that where a valid arbitration agreement exists and
the parties have delegated issues of arbitrability to an arbitrator, a court
should stay an action and compel arbitration. 36 The Court has not, however,
answered the question of who—an arbitrator or a court—should determine
whether a disputed contract falls within the section 1 exemption of the
FAA. The Court similarly has not determined whether the form or the
substance of a contractual relationship is the guiding principle behind
determining whether the contract is exempted from the FAA’s coverage.
Prior to New Prime, two circuits addressed the issue and decidedly split,
reaching different conclusions as to the ability of an arbitrator to determine
the court’s jurisdiction.
1. Arbitrators Should Determine the Applicability of the Section 1
Exemption: Green v. SuperShuttle International, Inc.
On one side of the split, the Eighth Circuit found that arbitrators could
decide the applicability of the section 1 exemption in a case considering a
contract between a busing corporation and a driver-franchisee. In Green v.
SuperShuttle International, Inc., a bus driver brought suit on behalf of
himself and other similarly situated individuals who had entered into Unit
Franchise Agreements (“UFAs”) with a shared-ride shuttle service, alleging
violations of state labor laws. 37 The defendant owned and operated a shuttle
service in which it classified its shuttle bus drivers as franchisees, as
opposed to employees, and required them to sign UFAs that contained an
arbitration agreement binding both parties to arbitrate any controversy
arising out of the UFA.38
The shuttle service removed the action to federal court and moved to
compel arbitration against the drivers.39 After finding that “it did not need
to decide whether [the] Section 1” exemption applied to the UFAs, the
district court granted the defendant’s motion to compel arbitration and
dismissed the action. 40 Petitioner appealed, claiming the district court erred
in granting the motion.41 The bus driver argued that “the district court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction to compel arbitration” under section 4 of
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

See supra Section II.B.
653 F.3d 766, 767 (8th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 767–68.
Id. at 768.
Id.
Id.
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the FAA because the UFAs were not subject to the FAA due to section 1’s
exemption. 42
The Eighth Circuit rejected this argument in a succinct opinion, holding
that because “the UFAs specifically incorporated the Rules of the American
Arbitration Association (AAA),” the “arbitrator has the power to determine
his or her own jurisdiction over a controversy between the parties.” 43
Further, the driver “agreed to have the arbitrator decide whether the”
section 1 exemption applied to the UFA.44 As was to be expected in light of
the misplaced favoritism toward compelling arbitration when there is any
semblance of a valid arbitration agreement, the Eighth Circuit surrendered
its own jurisdiction in favor of allowing an arbitrator to handle the
dispute. 45
2. The Judiciary Should Determine the Applicability of the Section 1
Exemption: In re Van Dusen
On the other side of the split, the Ninth Circuit answered the question of
whether an arbitrator should decide the applicability of the section 1
exemption in the negative.
In In re Van Dusen, two interstate truck drivers who had previously
entered into Independent Contractor Operating Agreements (“ICOAs”) with
a transportation company, brought a class action against the company
alleging various violations of state and federal labor laws. 46 The defendant
transportation company “moved to compel arbitration pursuant to
arbitration clauses contained in the ICOAs,”47 and petitioners opposed,
arguing “that the ICOAs were exempt from arbitration under Section 1 of
the FAA.”48 After finding that the ICOAs contained valid arbitration
clauses, “the District Court declined to rule on the applicability of the
exemption” to the present case, “holding that the question of whether an
employer/employee relationship existed between the parties was a question
for the arbitrator to decide in the first instance.” 49 The petitioners then

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id.
Id. at 769.
Id.
Id. at 770.
654 F.3d 838, 840 (9th Cir. 2011).
Id.
Id.
Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol72/iss3/7

2020]

NOTES

739

moved for certification of an interlocutory appeal and, upon denial, sought
mandamus relief before the Ninth Circuit. 50
The defendant argued that whether a contract was exempted by the FAA
is a “question of arbitrability,” and thus subject to determination by the
arbitrator.51 Petitioners advanced a novel argument, framing the question of
section 1’s applicability as an “antecedent determination.”52 Under this
theory, a court must first determine that a contract is, in fact, arbitrable
under section 1 of the FAA before it has jurisdiction to stay the action and
compel arbitration pursuant to sections 3 and 4 of the Act.53
Although the Ninth Circuit ultimately refused to extend mandamus relief
because mandamus relief is only available upon a showing of clear error by
the lower court,54 they did so only after stating unequivocally that “the best
reading of the law requires the district court to assess whether a section 1
exemption applies before ordering arbitration.”55
Citing Supreme Court precedent, the Ninth Circuit began with a textual
analysis of the FAA and found that the issue before it was not a “question
of arbitrability,” which would be sent to the arbitrator to decide, 56 but rather
an “antecedent agreement [that] the party seeking arbitration asks the
federal court to enforce.”57 The Ninth Circuit reasoned “that a district court
has no authority to compel arbitration under Section 4 where Section 1
exempts the underlying contract from the FAA’s provisions.”58 The Van
Dusen Court averred that holding otherwise “puts the cart before the horse”
50. Id.
51. Id. at 843.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 846; see also Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 380 (2004)
(“[O]nly exceptional circumstances amounting to a ‘judicial usurpation of power,’ or a ‘clear
abuse of discretion,’ will justify the invocation of this extraordinary remedy.”) (internal
citations omitted) (quoting Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 95 (1967); Bankers Life &
Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 383 (1953)); Ex parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258, 259–60
(1947) (noting the writ of mandamus is a “drastic and extraordinary” remedy “reserved for
really extraordinary causes”).
55. Van Dusen, 654 F.3d at 846.
56. Id. at 845. The Van Dusen Court looked to Supreme Court precedent in upholding
the proposition that “the law clearly permits parties to delegate ‘questions of arbitrability’ to
an arbitrator.” Id. at 844 (citing AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Comm’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S.
643, 649 (1986)). The court then used the Supreme Court’s definition of “questions of
arbitrability” as questions of “whether the parties have submitted a particular dispute to
arbitration.” Id. (quoting Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83 (2002)).
57. Id. at 845 (quoting Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 69 (2010)).
58. Id. at 843.
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and that “private contracting parties cannot, through the insertion of a
delegation clause, confer authority upon a district court that Congress chose
to withhold.”59
For seemingly the first time in the twenty-first century, a federal circuit
court was willing to analyze, in-depth, the text of the FAA prior to
compelling arbitration. The Ninth Circuit diverged from the status-quo by
holding that it is for the federal courts, and not arbitrators, to interpret
federal statutes and determine whether a court has appropriate jurisdiction
before applying federal law to the matter presently before it. The
divergence of the circuits and the prevalence of arbitration provisions
necessitated a clear resolution to the question of which adjudicator is bound
to resolve antecedent determinations of compliance with the FAA
exemptions. In Oliveira v. New Prime, the Supreme Court sought to do just
that.
III. Statement of the Case
A. Facts
New Prime, Inc. (“Prime”) “operates an interstate trucking company.” 60
As part of its business model, Prime recruits and trains new drivers under
its Student Truck Driver Program (the “Program”). 61 Under the Program,
recruits are required to attend a four-day orientation; “log 10,000 miles as a
driver or passenger” with an established Prime truck driver; pass an
examination to obtain a Commercial Driver’s License; log “30,000 more
miles as a B2” trainee; and, finally, attend one week of additional
orientation classes.62 Students are compensated at the rate “of $200 per
week for food[, ]which . . . must be repaid[]” upon completion, and
“fourteen cents per mile” for the 30,000 miles logged as a B2 trainee. 63
Prime charges tuition for the Program; however, Prime forgives this debt
for drivers who remain with the company for one year following successful
completion of the Program.64
Upon completion, new drivers are given a choice between entering into
either an employer-employee or independent contractor relationship with
59.
60.
(2019).
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 844.
Oliveira v. New Prime, Inc., 857 F.3d 7, 9 (1st Cir. 2017), affirmed, 139 S. Ct. 532
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 10.
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Prime. 65 By offering a $100 bonus, informing new drivers that they will
make more money as contractors, and providing streamlined access to
accounting and leasing services, Prime spurs drivers to serve as
independent contractors.66
Plaintiff, Dominic Oliveira, graduated from Prime’s Program. 67 Over the
course of the Program, Oliveira was paid according to Prime’s standard
compensation protocol.68 Prime, however, reduced Oliveira’s per-mile pay
during his time as a B2 trainee to recover the $200 per week that it paid him
for food and other expenses. 69 After successfully completing the Program
and being promised, among other things, higher pay and the freedom to set
his hours and haul freight for any company he pleased, Oliveira elected to
enter into an independent contractor relationship with Prime. 70 Oliveira was
assisted by firms that Prime recommended in forming a limited liability
company, leasing a truck, and purchasing fuel—all things he would need to
complete before he would be allowed to haul freight for Prime. 71 Oliveira
then signed an Independent Contractor Operating Agreement (“ICOA”),
officially entered into a working relationship with Prime, and began hauling
freight. 72
The ICOA contained the following conditions: (1) the specification that
the relationship between Prime and Oliveira was one “of carrier and
independent contractor and not an employer/employee relationship;” (2) a
provision allowing Oliveira “to provide transportation services to
companies besides Prime;” (3) a provision providing that Oliveira would be
able to “refuse to haul any load offered by Prime[] and determine his own
driving times and delivery routes;” (4) an obligation for Oliveira to pay all
expenses associated with and “incurred in connection with his use of the
truck leased” to him; and (5) an arbitration clause which obligated the
parties “to arbitrate ‘any disputes arising under, arising out of or relating
to’” the ICOA. 73
Shortly after Oliveira entered into the working relationship, the wheels
fell off. Almost immediately, Prime began significantly controlling
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 9–10.
Id. at 10.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting language from provisions of the contract).
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Oliveira’s work by requiring him to transport its shipments, complete
company training, and abide by all company rules and procedures. 74
Oliveira was unable to set his hours, refuse Prime shipments, or haul freight
for any other transportation company. 75 Further, Oliveira was underpaid for
the jobs he was required to take. 76 Tired of being overworked and undercompensated, he “stopped driving for Prime” altogether.77 Less than a
month later, however, Oliveira entered into a new working relationship with
Prime—this time as an employee. 78 Following his rehire, Oliveira’s job
responsibilities were “‘substantially identical’ to those he had as an
independent contractor.”79
B. Issue
Oliveira filed a class action suit against Prime, alleging violations of
federal and state labor laws. 80 “Prime moved to compel arbitration,”
asserting that because Oliveira had elected to enter into an independent
contractor relationship with Prime, as opposed to an employee-employer
relationship, he was not exempted from arbitration under section 1 of the
FAA.81 Oliveira countered, asserting “that the motion to compel arbitration
should be denied” for two reasons: (1) because the contract as a whole was
exempted from the FAA under section 1; and (2) because the question of
whether his ICOA was exempted under section 1 was for the court to
decide, not an arbitrator.82
The district court denied Prime’s motion to compel, holding that the
court should decide the applicability of the section 1 exemption and
determining that it could not answer the question of whether the exemption
applied in this case until after the parties conducted further discovery on
Oliveira’s employment status.83 Prime moved for interlocutory appeal of
the district court’s ruling, and the First Circuit granted review of two
distinct issues raised below: (1) whether a dispute over the applicability of
the section 1 exemption must be resolved by an arbitrator or by a court and

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 11.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 11–12.
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(2) whether the section 1 exemption encompasses independent contractor
agreements.84
C. Decision Below
The First Circuit began its analysis of the first issue by considering outof-circuit precedent cited by each party. 85 New Prime championed the
Eighth Circuit’s holding in Green v. SuperShuttle International, Inc. to
argue that the question of section 1’s applicability is an “issue of
arbitrability” and thus one for an arbitrator.86 Oliveira, however, cited the
Ninth Circuit’s holding in In re Van Dusen to support the contention that
the applicability question did not fit squarely within “questions of
arbitrability” and was therefore an “antecedent determination” for the court
to decide. 87
The court dismissed Green’s premise by framing the present issue as an
“antecedent determination” and stating that “[w]here . . . the parties dispute
whether the district court has the authority to compel arbitration under the
FAA, the extent of the arbitrator’s jurisdiction is of no concern.” 88 The First
Circuit reasoned that the holding in Green was illogical because it would
require a federal court to act under section 4 of the FAA—at the direction
of two private contracting parties—even though Congress plainly and
unambiguously withheld that exact authority from the courts in section 1.89
The First Circuit adopted the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit, deciding
that “the question of the court’s authority to act under the FAA is an
‘antecedent determination’ for the district court to make before it can
compel arbitration under the Act.”90 Ultimately, the court held that
“[n]othing . . . purports to allow the arbitrator to decide whether a federal
district court has the authority to act under a federal statute” when Congress
has expressly withheld that authority. 91 This finding allowed the First
Circuit to decide the second issue on appeal: whether the section 1
exemption applies to all agreements to do work or solely to “contracts of
employment.”
84. Id. at 9.
85. Id. at 12–14.
86. Id. at 12–13.
87. Id. at 14.
88. Id. at 15.
89. See id. (“[P]rivate contracting parties cannot, through the insertion of a delegation
clause, confer authority upon a district court . . . that Congress chose to withhold.”) (quoting
In re Van Dusen, 654 F.3d 838, 844 (9th Cir. 2011)).
90. Id. at 14 (citing Van Dusen, 654 F.3d at 843).
91. Id. at 15 (footnote omitted).
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According to the First Circuit, the applicability issue turned on whether
the agreement between Oliveira and New Prime, which “establish[ed] or
purport[ed] to establish an independent-contractor relationship,” fell within
the statutory language of “contracts of employment.”92 Prime argued that,
in light of a federal policy favoring arbitration, the court was compelled to
find that the exemption should be narrowly applied only to those contracts
which, on their face, give rise to an employer-employee relationship. 93
Oliveira disagreed, arguing that the section 1 exemption covers all
agreements to do work, regardless of one’s classification as an employee or
independent contractor.94
In responding to Prime’s contention that federal policy favoring
arbitration compelled the court’s decision, the First Circuit answered that
policy, no matter how strong or at what judicial level, cannot override the
meaning of the plain text of the statute. 95 The First Circuit began by
analyzing the ordinary meaning of “contracts of employment” in light of
dictionaries and secondary sources from the time of the enactment of the
FAA.96 The court concluded that the “ordinary meaning of the phrase” and
“Prime’s concession that Oliveira is a transportation worker” allowed for
only one finding: that Oliveira’s independent contractor agreement with
Prime fell squarely within the section 1 exemption.97 Moreover, the court
noted that its holding here—that “contracts of employment” means
“agreements to perform work and includes independent-contractor
agreements”—aligned with “Congress’s demonstrated concern with
transportation workers and their necessary role in the free flow of goods.” 98
D. Supreme Court Decision
1. Issue (1): Who Decides Whether the Section 1 Exemption Applies?
Prime timely filed a petition for writ of certiorari and the Supreme Court
granted the same for the 2018–2019 term. 99 The Supreme Court initiated its
analysis of the procedural issue by recognizing that “[w]hile a court’s
authority under the Arbitration Act to compel arbitration may be

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 16.
Id. at 10, 25.
Id. at 20.
Id. at 20–21.
Id.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 23 (quoting Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 121 (2001)).
New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 138 S. Ct. 1164 (mem.) (2018).
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considerable, it isn’t unconditional.” 100 The Court reasoned that “no matter
how emphatically they may express a preference for arbitration,” private
contracting parties cannot bestow upon a court the authority to stay
litigation and compel arbitration where the Act has expressly withheld as
much.101
Delving into the text of the Act, the Court noted the importance of the
statute’s sequencing, citing precedent for the proposition that the first four
sections of the Act “are integral parts of a whole.”102 Here, the Court
emphasized that enforceability under sections 3 and 4 depends on whether
those provisions are part of a contract covered by sections 1 and 2, which
“define the field in which Congress was legislating.”103 The Court
concluded that a court may only use sections 3 and 4 to enforce an
agreement to arbitrate “if the clause appears in a ‘written provision in . . . a
contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce’ consistent with
[section] 2. And only if the contract . . . doesn’t trigger [section] 1’s
‘contracts of employment’ exemption.” 104 Agreeing with the First Circuit,
the Court held “that a court should decide for itself whether [section] 1’s
‘contracts of employment’ exclusion applies before ordering arbitration.” 105
The Court then turned to Prime’s contention that the combination of a
delegation clause106 and the severability principle107 can serve as alternative
authority for sending parties to an arbitral forum nonetheless. Under this
theory, because Oliveira did not specifically challenge the delegation clause
and instead challenged the contract as a whole, Prime argued “that any
controversy should . . . proceed . . . before an arbitrator.”108 The Court
quickly dismissed this contention as “overlook[ing] the necessarily
100. New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532, 537 (2019).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 538 (quoting Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 201–02
(1956)).
103. Id. (quoting Bernhardt, 350 U.S. at 201–02).
104. Id. (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2018)).
105. Id. at 537.
106. “A delegation clause gives an arbitrator authority to decide even the initial question
whether the parties’ dispute is subject to arbitration.” Id. at 538 (citing Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc.
v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 68–69 (2010)).
107. “[U]nder the severability principle, we treat a challenge to the validity of an
arbitration agreement (or a delegation clause) separately from a challenge to the validity of
the entire contract in which it appears.” Id. (citing Rent-A-Ctr., 561 U.S. at 70–71). “Unless
a party specifically challenges the validity of the agreement to arbitrate, both sides may be
required to take all their disputes . . . to arbitration.” Id. (citing Rent-A-Ctr., 561 U.S. at 70–
71).
108. Id.
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antecedent statutory inquiry.”109 The Court reiterated that “[a] delegation
clause is merely a specialized type of arbitration agreement, and the Act
‘operates’” upon it in the same way as it does any other arbitration
agreement.110
2. Issue (2): Whether the Section 1 Exemption Applies to Independent
Contractors
After reciting the age-old adage “that words generally should be
interpreted as taking their ordinary . . . meaning . . . at the time Congress
enacted the statute,”111 the Court began resolving the merits issue by
analyzing the text of the Act and succinctly identifying the issue before it
as: What did the term “contracts of employment” mean at the time of
enactment?112
The Court noted that while the term “contracts of employment” today
signals the relationship arising from the law of agency between master and
servant, at the time of adoption, the phrase “usually meant nothing more
than agreement to perform work.” 113 To support this contention, the Court
pointed to the fact that the term “contract of employment” was not defined
in any of the popular or legal dictionaries at the time of the FAA’s
enactment. 114 The Court reasoned this lack of coverage signified that the
phrase was not a term of art carrying a specialized meaning; therefore, it
should be interpreted simply by analyzing the meaning of each word. 115
The merits dispute was thus decided based on the meaning of the word
“employment.”116 The Court found that dictionaries of the enactment era
tended to treat “employment” as a synonym for “work” and did not
“distinguish between different kinds of work or workers.”117 Moreover, the
Court noted that its cases, as well as state court cases and federal and state
statutes, commonly used the phrase to describe the relationship of
independent contractor and principal. 118 The Court found greater support for
the notion that “employment” includes independent contractor relationships
109. Id.
110. Id. (quoting Rent-A-Ctr., 561 U.S. at 70).
111. Id. at 539 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Wis. Cent. Ltd. v. United States, 138
S. Ct. 2067, 2074 (2018)).
112. Id. at 539–44.
113. Id. at 539.
114. Id.
115. See id. at 539–40.
116. See id. at 539–41.
117. Id. at 539–40.
118. Id. at 540.
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when analyzing the text surrounding the phrase. 119 In drafting section 1’s
language, Congress refrained from using the word “employees” or
“servants” and instead spoke of “workers.”120 This choice, explained the
Court, “easily embraces independent contractors.”121
Noting Prime’s inability to explain away the plain meaning of the phrase
at the time of enactment, the Court then considered Prime’s policy
argument that federal policy favoring arbitration compelled the Court to
send the case to an arbitral forum. 122 Without negating this contention, the
Court reasoned that it must nonetheless “‘respect the limits up to which
Congress was prepared’ to go when adopting the Arbitration Act.” 123 The
Court held that the plain text of the Act, coupled with the judiciary’s
inability to override the boundaries set by Congress, could only lead to one
conclusion: the section 1 exemption encompasses all agreements to do
work—even those that purport to, or in fact do, establish an independent
contractor-principal relationship.124
IV. Getting the FAA Back on the Road
Through legal doctrine and failure to independently interpret federal
statutes, courts have historically allowed businesses to draft contractual
agreements for workers in such a manner that abolishes the ability of those
who perform services from seeking redress for violations of law and for
breach of contract in a judicial forum. New Prime radically departs from the
status quo and brings arbitration jurisprudence back in accord with the
purpose for which the Federal Arbitration Act was enacted.
A. Issue (1): Who Should Determine Issues of “Antecedent Determination”
Such as the Applicability of the Section 1 Exemption of the FAA
In 1803, Chief Justice John Marshall declared, “It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” 125
Because a different interpretation of the FAA threatened to severely
diminish the due process rights of the parties126 and ultimately dispose of
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
(Black,

See id. at 540–41.
Id. at 541.
Id.
Id. at 543.
Id. (quoting United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 267, 298 (1970)).
See id. at 542–44.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 407 (1967)
J., dissenting) (“I am by no means sure that thus forcing a person to forgo his
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some controversies altogether,127 the Court in New Prime appropriately
reserved the power to determine the scope of the Act’s application for the
judiciary. From a policy perspective, arbitrators are ill-equipped and
inappropriately incentivized to determine the applicability of the section 1
exemption. Furthermore, under the language of the Act, arbitrators have no
right to subjugate the federal courts’ jurisdiction. Instead, Congress granted
that power to the judiciary.
Although the Court declined to discuss its policy reasoning when
deciding the procedural question, its holding is supported by a logical
policy argument that the judiciary should resolve questions concerning the
applicability of the Act. While today’s arbitrators are often highly skilled
and knowledgeable adjudicators, they serve as no real substitute for the
federal courts in their ability to determine the applicability of federal
statutes.
Three concerns arise from the prospect of allowing arbitrators to
determine the applicability of the section 1 exemption. First, under the rules
of the American Arbitration Association, arbitrators are not required to
have ever practiced law. 128 Second, as noted by Justice Black in his Prima
Paint Corporation v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co. dissent,
arbitrators “even if qualified to apply the law, [are] not bound to do so.” 129
Third, arbitrators are wholly incentivized to resolve matters in a manner
that keeps them within the arbitrator’s jurisdiction. 130
When the judiciary decides the applicability of the Act, however, these
three concerns become moot. The judiciary is comprised solely of attorneys
well versed in law, duty-bound to apply it, and lacking any incentive to
usurp judicial authority. Further, as noted by Justice Black, “a reasonable
opportunity to try his legal issues in the courts where, unlike the situation in arbitration, he
may have a jury trial and right to appeal, is not a denial of due process of law.”).
127. See First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995) (“Hence, who—
court or arbitrator—has the primary authority to decide whether a party has agreed to
arbitrate can make a critical difference to a party resisting arbitration.”).
128. Qualification Criteria for Admittance to the AAA National Roster of Arbitrators,
AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, http://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/document_repository/
Qualification_Criteria_for_Admittance_to_the_AAA_National_Roster_of_Arbitrators.pdf
(last visited Oct. 14, 2019) (noting that applicants for membership must meet or exceed the
requirement of a “[m]inimum of 10 years of senior-level business or professional experience
or legal practice”).
129. Prima Paint Corp., 388 U.S. at 407 (Black, J., dissenting).
130. See id. at 416 (Black, J., dissenting) (“The only advantage of submitting the
issue . . . to arbitration is for the arbitrators. Their compensation corresponds to the volume
of arbitration they perform.”).
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and fair reading of [the] Act’s language and history” demonstrates
Congress’s intent not to “trespass upon the courts’ prerogative to decide the
legal question of whether any legal contract exists upon which to base
arbitration.”131 Therefore, from a policy standpoint, arbitration “is not a
proper remedy for . . . questions with which the arbitrators have no
particular experience and which are better left to the determination of
skilled judges with a background of legal experience and established
systems of law.”132
An analysis of the text of the Act itself and the Supreme Court’s
precedential treatment of its sequencing reveals a similar conclusion. While
after the Court’s decision in Rent-A-Center parties may contractually
designate an arbitrator to determine questions of arbitrability, “a court’s
authority under the Arbitration Act to compel arbitration . . . isn’t
unconditional”133 and is bound by the limits set by Congress in sections 1
and 2. The Court has, at least since 1956, stressed the significance of the
Act’s sequencing and recognized that each of the Act’s sections are
“integral parts of a whole.”134 Further, the Court has found that sections 1
and 2 “define the field in which Congress was legislating,” and that sections
3 and 4 only apply to contracts within that field. 135 The Court has also
recognized that “the enforceability of arbitration provisions” (i.e., sections 3
and 4) “depends on whether those provisions are ‘part of . . . a contract
“evidencing a transaction involving commerce”’” under section 2. 136
Following this line of reasoning, and understanding that section 1 helps
define the types of contracts contemplated by section 2,137 there is only one
conclusion—courts may not stay proceedings properly before them and
compel arbitration under section 4 prior to determining their own
jurisdiction under sections 1 and 2.
Consistent with both policy and text, the Court in New Prime took a
momentous step towards restoring the due process rights of those
individuals who are parties to a contract that one party claims should fall

131. Id. at 407–08 (Black, J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 415–16 n.15 (Black, J., dissenting) (quoting Julius Henry Cohen & Kenneth
Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA. L. REV. 265, 281 (1926)).
133. New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532, 537 (2019).
134. Id. at 538 (quoting Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 201–02
(1956)).
135. Id. (quoting Bernhardt, 350 U.S. at 201).
136. Id. (quoting Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1984)).
137. See id. at 537 (“§ 1 helps define § 2’s terms.”).
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within the FAA’s coverage. The New Prime Court rightly held that it is for
the judiciary to analyze and adjudicate federal statutes.
B. Issue (2): Whether the Section 1 Exemption Applies to Independent
Contractors
Section 1 of the FAA sets forth the premise that “nothing” within the Act
shall apply to “contracts of employment of . . . any . . . class of workers
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.” 138 Despite this seemingly broad
and straight-forward language, the statute has, for decades, been misapplied
in a nefariously underinclusive manner. 139 Historically, corporations have
been able to skirt the Act’s section 1 exemption to mandatory arbitration by
simply classifying those who carry out their day-to-day revenue-generating
activities as “independent contractors” as opposed to “employees,”
regardless of whether there exists any substantial difference in the everyday
functions of such individuals.
This dichotomous, form-over-function approach has plagued many
potentially meritorious actions brought by plaintiffs against the company
with which they have contracted to perform services by sending them to
arbitral forums that often lack procedural and evidentiary safeguards.
Despite the broad language of the Act, which seems to cover all “workers,”
courts have refused to include contracts that purport to establish an
independent contractor agreement within the language of section 1’s
exemption. Courts have primarily offered two justifications as to why the
section 1 exemption does not cover independent contractor agreements: (1)
the liberal federal policy favoring arbitral dispute resolution and (2) the
Supreme Court’s instruction to narrowly construe the section 1
exemption. 140
138. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2018).
139. See, e.g., Lenz v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 431 F.3d 348 (8th Cir. 2005) (enforcing an
arbitration agreement for a customer service representative for an interstate trucking
company); Palcko v. Airborne Express, Inc., 372 F.3d 588 (3d Cir. 2004) (enforcing an
arbitration agreement under state law despite determining that the employee in question was
engaged in interstate commerce).
140. See, e.g., Villalpando v. Transguard Ins. Co. of Am., 17 F. Supp. 3d 969, 982 (N.D.
Cal. 2014) (“[C]onsidering that the § 1 exclusion is to be both interpreted narrowly and
understood to favor arbitration the Court declines to find at this time that Plaintiff is exempt
from the FAA.”) (citations omitted); Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n v. Swift Transp.
Co., 288 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1035–36 (D. Ariz. 2003) (“Given the strong and liberal federal
policy favoring arbitral dispute resolution, the Court cannot conclude on this record that § 1
bars the enforcement of the arbitration provision at issue.”); Morning Star Assocs., Inc. v.
Unishippers Glob. Logistics, LLC, No. CV 115-033, 2015 WL 2408477, at *4–5 (S.D. Ga.
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Nonetheless, the New Prime Court grabbed the wheel and veered back
onto the road Congress intended. New Prime used a textualist analysis to
close the form over function loophole in the simplest way possible—not by
distinguishing between an “employee” and “independent contractor,” but
by instead concluding that both fall within the scope of the exemption.
Although it ultimately refused to offer an analysis of as much, New Prime is
consistent with both the legislative history behind the Act and the Court’s
precedential treatment of the language of the section 1 exemption.
The legislative history of the Act, though sparse, is demonstrative of
Congress’s intent behind its enactment. Congress adopted the FAA to
compel federal courts to enforce arbitration agreements, during a time of
undue hostility toward arbitration, by placing agreements to arbitrate
disputes “upon the same footing as other contracts, where [they]
belong[].”141 Originally proposed by trade associations dealing in groceries
and other perishables and from commercial and mercantile groups,142 the
Act was designed to guarantee certain procedural advantages at a time
when there was “much agitation against the costliness and delays of
litigation.”143 While the benefits of expediting dispute resolution for
produced, shipped, bought, or sold commodities were obvious, the
potentially overbroad scope of the Act created significant concerns.
As the Court noted, Congress plainly “demonstrated concern with
transportation workers and their necessary role in the free flow of goods.” 144
The main opposition to the Act came from members of organized labor
organizations who noted “the potential disparity in bargaining power
between individual employees and large employers.”145 These organizations
were concerned with the potential the Act had to “require courts to enforce
unfair employment contracts,”146 especially “insurance, employment,
construction, and shipping contracts . . . routinely . . . being offered on a
take-it-or-leave-it basis to captive customers or employees.”147
May 20, 2015); Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n v. United Van Lines, LLC, No.
4:06CV219 JCH, 2006 WL 5003366, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 15, 2006).
141. H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1 (1924).
142. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 410 n.2 (1967)
(Black, J., dissenting) (citing 50 A.B.A. REP. 357 (1925)).
143. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 360 (2011) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 2 (1924)).
144. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 121 (2001).
145. Id. at 132 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
146. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
147. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 414 (1967) (Black,
J., dissenting).
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Labor disputes, however, were never designed to be within the scope of
the Act. In fact, the chairman of the ABA committee that drafted the
legislation stated at a Senate Judiciary Subcommittee hearing that “[i]t is
not intended that this shall be an act referring to labor disputes, at all.” 148
The chairman further noted that should the Subcommittee fear any danger
of labor disputes coming within the purview of the Act, they should add the
language of “but nothing herein contained shall apply to seamen or any
class of workers in interstate and foreign commerce” to clarify the point. 149
As such, when Congress drafted the final version of the Act, it had
essentially adopted that exact language. 150 The logical connection between
the chairman’s words and Congress’s actions point only to the conclusion
that Congress did not mean to include within the scope of the Act any labor
disputes between parties engaged in the production, shipment, purchase, or
sale of commodities, regardless of their relationship.
Moreover, the decision in New Prime, while being a radical departure
from the status quo of lower courts, is nonetheless consistent with the
Court’s precedential treatment of the section 1 exemption. The Court has
held that “the exclusion provision is limited to transportation workers,
defined, for instance, as those workers ‘actually engaged in the movement
of goods in interstate commerce.’” 151 Further, the Court has held that “[i]t
would be rational for Congress to ensure that workers in general would be
covered by the provisions of the FAA, while reserving for itself more
specific legislation for those engaged in transportation.” 152 Knowing the
importance of careful word choice, had the Court intended that the section 1
exemption apply only to employees, it would have used that term in
describing the scope. 153
By reasoning that the text of the FAA, as it was understood at the time of
drafting, indicates that independent contractor-principal relationships
should be included in the plain meaning of the term “contracts of
employment,” the New Prime Court rightly decided the merits issue and
148. Sales and Contracts to Sell in Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and Federal
Commercial Arbitration: Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before a Subcomm. of the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong. 9 (1923) (statement of W.H.H. Platt, Chairman of the
Committee of Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law of the American Bar Association).
149. Id.
150. See 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2018).
151. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 112 (2001) (citing Cole v. Burns
Int’l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1471 (D.C. Cir. 1997)) (emphasis added).
152. Id. at 121 (emphasis added).
153. See New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532, 542 (2019) (“But if the parties’
extended etymological debate persuades us of anything, it is that care is called for.”).
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brought arbitration jurisprudence back in accord with the reasons for which
the FAA was drafted and precedent surrounding the applicability of section
1.
V. Conclusion and Future Implications
Transportation and logistics play an integral role in the United States
economy. In 2017, this sector comprised “8.9 percent of the Nation’s
economy as measured by gross domestic product.” 154 Further, as of 2002,
independent contractors owned more than 545,000 trucks operated on
United States roads.155
After New Prime, transportation employers may now find that many of
the half million contracts they entered into with those independent
contractors contain invalid arbitration agreements. It is important to note,
however, that contracting parties may still participate in arbitral
proceedings even though federal courts may not recognize these arbitration
agreements as a legal compulsion to do so. Because of this, the true impact
of New Prime is difficult to ascertain. While the Court’s decision has
tremendous potential to impact the transportation industry—and the
nation’s economy as a whole—by forcing disputes into court where costs
are higher and resolution is often less expeditious, countless factors will
need to be evaluated before determining the true impact.
Though it is impossible to predict the future, it is prudent to set forth
some of the possible questions and considerations that may arise following
the Court’s decision. The actual economic impact will depend on whether
transportation workers alleging injury will, in fact, pursue their claims in
the courts of law. This question likely turns on factors such as a potential
plaintiff’s knowledge of the law and recognition of a legally cognizable
injury, a cost-benefit analysis of an alleged injury, and a willingness to
endure lengthy legal proceedings.
The scope of the potential impact will depend on whether potential
plaintiffs can aggregate claims. Litigating individual claims, while likely
costlier than arbitration, will not have the same economic impact on the
industry as class action settlements and judgments. However, it may be
difficult to aggregate claims and assemble a class of plaintiffs large enough
154. BUREAU OF TRANSP. STATISTICS, FREIGHT FACTS AND FIGURES 2017, at 5-1 (2017)
(from chapter 5, “Economic Characteristics of the Freight Transportation Industry”).
155. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2002 ECONOMIC CENSUS: VEHICLE INVENTORY AND USE
SURVEY 15, 39 (Dec. 2004), https://www2.census.gov/library/publications/economic-census/
2002/vehicle-inventory-and-use-survey/ec02tv-us.pdf.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2020

754

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:731

to prove worthwhile because control within the transportation industry is
not highly centralized. 156
Further still remains the question of whether transportation employers
will pass any potential additional cost on to consumers. In an industry with
such fierce competition and low margins that is already plagued by low
barriers to entry resulting in an excess of supply, 157 those who demand
transportation services may take a “next man up” approach.
Last, but certainly not least, remains the question of whether talented
legal drafters will find a way to work around the exemption. While the New
Prime Court afforded the exemption a generous reach, it surely is not
without bounds. Should legal drafters engineer a circumvention, the
discussion of economic impact will be wholly moot.
Despite all the unknowns, one thing is certain: the text of the Federal
Arbitration Act, its legislative history, and Supreme Court precedent all
support the conclusion that New Prime was correctly decided. However,
only time will tell whether the Court created a free-flowing interstate or a
massive pile-up when it put the wheels back on independent contracting
transportation workers’ ride to court.
Reed C. Trechter

156. See U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP. FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., EVALUATION OF U.S.
COMMERCIAL M OTOR CARRIER INDUSTRY CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES (2003),
https://ops.fhwa.dot.gov/freight/publications/eval_mc_industry/index.htm.
157. See id.
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